Ukraine at the Crossroads
This year's political season in Ukraine has started on an extraordinarily high note. On September 8, President Yushchenko sacked the government headed by his long-time political ally and No. 2 in the Orange Revolution Yuliya Tymoshenko. In a televised address meant to convey the logic of his decision, he lamented the loss of trust among his team members and said that he no longer wished to broker peace deals between the warring factions inside the government. Ms. Tymoshenko's strong and vociferous reaction, accusing the President of betrayal, signified in unmistakably stark terms the end of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko alliance, a principal driver of the Orange Revolution.
The split within the Yushchenko coalition has put Ukraine back into the spotlight of international attention. The first couple of days after Tymoshenko's dismissal saw a myriad of media reports and commentary conjuring up images of turmoil and government implosion, all culminating in The Economist's sombre question, whether Ukraine's democratic dream might be foundering. But, as Yushchenko appeared to take matters under control and calm down political passions, some pundits started talking about "a healthy sign of democratic accountability" in Ukraine - the pendulum began swinging in the optimistic direction.
As usual, the reality is more nuanced, and does not lend itself easily to the dichotomous logic of the end-of-democracy and normal-democratic-politics discourse.
As disheartening and dumbfounding as it has been for many in Ukraine, the break-up of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko nexus should hardly be seen as the defeat of the Orange Revolution's purposes. Indeed, it is surprising that their alliance has survived this long! The centrifugal forces of personal ambition and disagreements over strategy and tactics were pulling them apart even in the midst of the presidential election campaign. As soon as the glue-Kuchma and his handpicked successor-waned from the scene, there was little else to bind them together. Old rivalries were let loose.
Most commentators have deplored the fact of partition fearing that it will lead to a counter-revolution and the resurgence of anti-democratic forces. Granted that it is still early to give a final verdict, the odds of the exact opposite occurring appear to be high. Instead of undoing democratic accomplishments, the rupture between the two key figures in the Orange Revolution may strengthen democratic institutions in Ukraine by giving it a genuine opposition to serve as a check upon the new powers' ambition and a reminder of the basic democratic postulate: power is derived from the consent of the governed.
The lack of a coherent and articulate opposition, committed to democratic values and norms, has been a serious problem in Ukraine since independence. Frustrated with the government policies masqueraded as democratic and market reforms, some Ukrainians vented their anger by voting for the communists who invariably promised the return of the good old days; but many cynically voted for those who would pay more. The upshot of this development was a parliament dominated by two seemingly incompatible forces—tycoons and communists-none of which for its own parochial reasons was interested in making Ukraine a democratic state.
Amidst the mud-slinging contest that has been taking place over the past couple of weeks, there are reassuring signs that constructive competition between the pro-Yushchenko and pro-Tymoshenko forces may be emerging. Both sides agreed to stop "the war of kompromat" and observe the rules of civility during the parliamentary campaign. If the current trend persists, Ukraine is likely to have a parliament where political forces do not fight over principles, but broadly accept the lofty ideals of the Orange Revolution and offer alternative ways of translating them into sound public policies.
There is, of course, no guarantee that fighting will not spin out of control and that there will not be only politics and no policy. The danger that the contestants will dilute their principles in search of allies is not negligible. That neither side appears to have foresworn foreign allies with tarnished democratic credentials is a worrisome development.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic. Ukraine's civil society is both vibrant and robust. It will act as a constraint and a source of realism for politicians. Less tangibly, but perhaps more importantly, the Ukrainian people feel more capable of effecting change as a result of the Orange Revolution experience. If the governors fail in their duties, the governed will be now be much more likely to withdraw their consent.
Alexander Demyanets, John Smith Fellow 2005
Fellow, Razumkov Centre, Ukraine