Democratic Civilian Oversight of the Security Sector in Ukraine: Enduring Challenges

Alexander Demyanets, Ukraine

Democratic civilian oversight of the security sector is a sine qua non of any democracy. Although Ukraine has made real progress in this area thanks to its relationship with NATO, democratic oversight of security institutions in Ukraine continues to be weak and ineffective by Euro-Atlantic standards. The fall of the Orange coalition and the return of power politics to the centre stage have made it clear that four enduring challenges will continue to face the country.

The first challenge is the grossly asymmetrical relationship between the president and parliament in security and defence matters. Under the Ukrainian constitution, the president is responsible for safeguarding national security and the independence of the state.  He is commander-in-chief of the armed forces; he declares wars, states of emergency, orders military mobilization, appoints the high command of the armed forces and other military formations, and ‘administers the sphere of national security and defence of the State.’ He has the authority to establish, reorganize and disband ministries and ‘other central bodies of executive power.’

By contrast, the constitutional provisions relating to the powers of the parliament are more restrictive. In practice, too, the parliament’s authority has been circumscribed by the lack of relevant sub-laws, resistance from security institutions, and by the president himself. Effective parliamentary oversight, however, is crucial to a functioning democracy. It gives security institutions democratic legitimacy and subjects national security policy to scrutiny and discussion. Redressing the current imbalance demands strategic vision and statesmanship from the president.

The Soviet security culture represents the second challenge to democratic oversight of the security sector. In the Soviet system, knowledge was highly compartmentalized, and transparency was seen as a threat to the system’s survival. The practice was not to share information, but to confine it to a narrow circle, even at the cost of effective policy-making. This culture was characterized by great secrecy, suspicion, and resistance to outside scrutiny, particularly from MPs who were considered to lack professional judgment and discretion when handling state secrets. An overhaul of structures and training may facilitate a change of attitude, but it could take at least a generation before there is a real change in security culture. 

The lack of civilian experts and policy advisers familiar with security and defence issues poses a third major challenge. Because the Communist Party entrusted knowledge to military and security agencies, in today’s Ukraine few outside these sectors understand budgets and tradecraft. The shortage of civilian expertise is especially acute in the parliament which, unlike its counterpart in the UK, cannot rely on a standing corps of civilian experts or defence and security expertise in civil society. Although overseas training may increase the supply of civilian professionals, only the development of an indigenous capacity can solve the problem. Building this will require getting national priorities right in conditions of shrinking budgets and the lower political profile of security issues. 

The fourth challenge arises from the fact that, as in most European countries, defence and security affairs do not figure prominently on the political agenda in Ukraine. Policymakers tend to be preoccupied with socioeconomic reforms, privatization and healthcare, or issues on which political capital can be made, instead of less tangible security matters. While in Central Europe national consensus on the importance of NATO membership has helped to make national security more respectable and larger defence budgets more palatable, in Ukraine NATO remains controversial. Statesmanship and perseverance are needed to devise alternative incentives and communicate them to the political class and the public at large.

Overcoming these challenges requires national consensus on issues of strategic importance and agendas that go beyond personal ambition and business interests. However, the split of the Orange forces has demonstrated that, contrary to the hopes of many, Ukrainian politics has not been revolutionized. In the wake of the March 2006 parliamentary elections, incremental change in the security and defence sector will be the best one can hope for.

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