A Measure of Confidence
By Dmitry Polikanov, 2001 John Smith Fellow
Special to Russia Profile
What Do Russians Think About China?
Russia’s relationship with China has greatly improved over the past few years as a result of both geopolitical ambition and clear economic necessity. Moscow enjoys its role of bridging East and West including being the only country capable of engaging Beijing in an international alliance that includes a military component. And Russia certainly benefits from the diversification of oil and gas flows eastward, giving Moscow more trump cards in the global energy game.
At the same time, opinions expressed in Russia about China are quite polarized and vary from racist epithets to slogans praising China as an economic miracle and as Russia’s major partner in overthrowing America’s global hegemony. Various surveys indicate a generally positive perception of China in the context of political and diplomatic interaction. According to the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM), 40% of Russians emphasize that Russia’s relations with China are normal, while another 34% regard them as friendly or neighbourly. Only 15% describe China in negative terms, stressing animosity between the countries.
The same general viewpoint can be found in an assessment of China’s status as an ally. Thirty- four percent of respondents claim that Beijing is Russia’s strategic and economic partner, another 22% call it a friendly state, while only 28% mention China as any sort of rival.
Russian perceptions of China have changed dramatically in the recent past, and any current assessment of Chinese-Russian relations should not necessarily be considered a reliable indicator for the future. One of the most vivid trends in tracking Russian attitudes toward China is the increasing number of people who are becoming dissatisfied with China.
On one hand, 38% of Russians agree that their opinion has not changed in the last 10 years and another 16% demonstrate indifference. However, in the Far East the difference is much sharper 36% of respondents say that their opinion of China has changed for the better, while 28% say their perception has worsened, compared with only 12 percent nationwide.
The Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) has compared statistics from 2006 with those from 2001 and found that the quantity of respondents who perceive China as a friendly state has decreased from 67 to 48%, while 30% think of it as hostile up from 18% five years ago. Twenty-two percent of Russians interviewed by VTsIOM expect Beijing to remain Russia’s friend and ally throughout the 21st century, and another 26% hope for a future partnership. Nonetheless, nearly 27% (43% in the Far East and 36% in Siberia) fear that China may become a dangerous neighbour or even an enemy of Russia. FOM respondents are more explicit in their forecasts 41% believe that the strengthening of China jeopardizes Russia’s interests, while only 36% do not agree with this statement. While Russians are happy with the relations for now, the future remains uncertain.
Part of the concern over China’s growth can be explained by noting the positive attitude of Russians in general towards China’s economic model. Sixty-seven percent of Russians asked by the Levada Center maintain that they have a favourable opinion of the Chinese economic system. Sixty-seven percent of FOM respondents believe that Russia’s Eastern neighbour is developing more dynamically and successfully than Russia, and 47 percent agree that in the next 10 years China will take leading positions in world economics and politics, but that these positions will generally come at Russia’s expense.
Fifty-three percent of VTsIOM interviewees maintain that China benefits more from bilateral economic cooperation than Russia. In the Far East, this number grows to 75 percent. These numbers reflect Russians’ awareness that the trade ties between the two countries are asymmetrical. China’s rapid expansion into the Russian market damages indigenous industries, since it exports a variety of goods and boasts larger volumes, better quality and lower prices. Survey respondents also point out that while Chinese exports to Russia are diversified, Russia focuses more on natural resources.
Because many Russians, particularly in the Far East, fear the effect of Chinese imports on their jobs, they naturally want to restrict this economic expansion. Eighty-one percent of respondents in Siberia and the Far East believe that there is no need to attract Chinese companies and migrants to eastern Russia. Nationwide, these numbers go down but remain high. Many Russians also agree with protectionist positions: 62% would prefer to stop the sales of Chinese goods in Russian shops, 82% are against selling real estate and property to Chinese businessmen and 81% would not want to see more Chinese workers in Russian enterprises. Additionally, over 60% of Russians would campaign for tougher regulations to support these feelings. However, such nationalist sentiments also hold true with respect to other countries, even former Soviet republics like Ukraine and Belarus.
Russians also support the maintenance of Russia’s territorial integrity. Seventy-six percent disagreed with the return of islands in the Amur River to China. Focus group participants argue that such a move would be bad for the image of the Russian state and a serious blow to the morale of the local population. Again, territorial integrity is a fundamental position in general and applies to any territorial dispute, including Karelia, near the Finnish border, and the Kuril Islands, claimed by Japan.
Unlike the population in the 1960s and 1970s, today’s Russians are not afraid of military aggression or direct military clashes with China. Forty-six percent of respondents in a survey conducted by the Levada Center believe that China will not use its military potential to threaten Russia.
In contrast, 74% of respondents fear hostile military action from the United States. From these results, it is not surprising that Russians are very open toward joint military exercises with China: 51% of FOM respondents approve of them. Russians support the exercises because they give Russia and China the opportunity “to learn more about each other, to become friendlier” (16%) and “to exchange knowledge and experience in the military sphere” (15%). The 17% of Russians who are opposed to such exercises argue that they “demonstrate Russia’s weaknesses and secrets” to a “large and powerful China” (6%) or because they think of China as our “potential adversary” and believe it is capable of “harming Russia” (4%).
Military cooperation is not the only area in which Russians express more positive views about China than of the United States. Fifty-seven percent of Levada Center survey participants maintain that China has a positive influence on global affairs, while 20% disagree. In contrast, only 25%of Russians believe that the United States has a constructive impact on the world.
In a hypothetical conflict between China and the United States, 36% of VTsIOM respondents would support Beijing, while only 21% would support the United States. The Russians who would back China are largely based in Moscow and St. Petersburg (64%), followed by those living in European Russia (45%). This reaction could be a result of U.S. policies in Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War, or a lack of first-hand experience with China, or a combination of both. In contrast, those Russians living in Siberia and the Far East, who have a greater fear of Chinese encroachment, would support the United States in a war, and encourage Moscow to join an alliance with Washington in order to stand up to Beijing.
While the current attitude of Russians appears generally favourable, and even positive, this assessment cannot be taken as a prediction for the future. As China develops, negative perceptions already present in Siberia and the Far East may become more prevalent nationwide.
It seems likely that Russians will continue to be supportive of the current political arrangement orienting Moscow and Beijing toward an alliance that would provide a counter-balance to American dominance. Russians mostly regard China as an ally. However, China can hardly become a vector for Russia’s integration into the global economy. When it comes to economic links, access to Russian natural resources or labour market, survey respondents demonstrate significant restraint and do not seek further rapprochement.
While the majority of Russians hope for continued general cooperation with China, there remains some frustration and envy of China’s skyrocketing economic growth and its rapid progress toward establishing itself as a global power. These apprehensions may become aggravated should China stand in the way of Moscow’s resurgent foreign policy.
Both countries are currently jockeying for position within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the potential certainly exists for them to become rivals rather than partners. It is important for Russia to avoid any policy that would render it a pawn in China’s strategic aims, primarily as a counterbalance against the United States. Moscow must keep its independence in decision-making. Besides being good policy, that is what the public expects from the Kremlin.
This article first appeared in Russia Profile on 28th September 2006, reproduced with permission of Dmitry Polikanov.
(The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Smith Memorial Trust)
September 2006